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evaluation of strategies to control  
a Potential Outbreak of Foot-and-
Mouth Disease in sweden
Fernanda C. Dórea1*, Maria Nöremark1, Stefan Widgren1, Jenny Frössling1,  
Anette Boklund2, Tariq Halasa2 and Karl Ståhl1
1 Department of Disease Control and Epidemiology, National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Uppsala, Sweden, 2 Department  
of Diagnostics and Scientific Advice, The National Veterinary Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark
To minimize the potential consequences of an introduction of foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) in Europe, European Union (EU) member states are required to present a contin-
gency plan. This study used a simulation model to study potential outbreak scenarios 
in Sweden and evaluate the best control strategies. The model was informed by the 
Swedish livestock structure using herd information from cattle, pig, and small ruminant 
holdings in the country. The contact structure was based on animal movement data and 
studies investigating the movements between farms of veterinarians, service trucks, and 
other farm visitors. All scenarios of outbreak control included depopulation of detected 
herds, 3 km protection and 10 km surveillance zones, movement tracing, and 3 days 
national standstill. The effect of availability of surveillance resources, i.e., number of field 
veterinarians per day, and timeliness of enforcement of interventions, was assessed. With 
the estimated currently available resources, an FMD outbreak in Sweden is expected 
to be controlled (i.e., last infected herd detected) within 3 weeks of detection in any 
evaluated scenario. The density of farms in the area where the epidemic started would 
have little impact on the time to control the outbreak, but spread in high density areas 
would require more surveillance resources, compared to areas of lower farm density. The 
use of vaccination did not result in a reduction in the expected number of infected herds. 
Preemptive depopulation was able to reduce the number of infected herds in extreme 
scenarios designed to test a combination of worst-case conditions of virus introduction 
and spread, but at the cost of doubling the number of herds culled. This likely resulted 
from a combination of the small outbreaks predicted by the spread model, and the high 
efficacy of the basic control measures evaluated, under the conditions of the Swedish 
livestock industry, and considering the assumed control resources available. The results 
indicate that the duration and extent of FMD outbreaks could be kept limited in Sweden 
using the EU standard control strategy and a 3 days national standstill.
Keywords: foot-and-mouth disease, spread model, simulation, vaccination, stamping out, outbreak control
inTrODUcTiOn
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is described by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
as “the most contagious disease of mammals” (1). The FMD virus (FMDV, family Picornaviridae, 
genus Aphthovirus) causes an acute vesicular disease in cloven-hoofed animals. Seven FMDV 
serotypes have been described, with cross-protection among serotypes not being observed: O, A, C, 
FigUre 1 | Overview of the events simulated stochastically in the DTU-DADs 
model.
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Asia1, and SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 (2). Due to its exceptional eco-
nomic impact, the disease is a high priority in disease surveil-
lance, contingency planning, and trading agreements around 
the globe. Despite not being a zoonosis, the disease can have 
severe psychosocial impact for the farming society. The extent 
of the negative effects of an outbreak in previously free coun-
tries, such as economic, social, and in animal welfare, can be 
demonstrated by the European 2001 outbreak that started in 
the UK (3).
In 2000 and 2001, outbreaks in the Republic of Korea, Japan, 
Russia, Mongolia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Republic 
of Ireland, France, and the Netherlands were caused by FMDV 
of serotype O (of a particular genetic lineage named the PanAsia 
strain) (4). The European outbreak ignited an intense debate 
regarding the best control strategy during the outbreak, as well 
as their effect on trading reestablishment after the outbreak. 
The discussions resulted in a revision of the European Union 
(EU) legislation for the control of FMD, now established in the 
Council Directive 2003/85/EC. One of the main new elements 
of the current legislation, compared to previous ones, is the 
emphasis on preparation of contingency plans (5). Countries are 
urged to include the preparation for a “worst-case” scenario in 
the plan, and contingency plans should be regularly updated in 
light of current information.
Mathematical modeling was used extensively during the 2001 
FMD outbreak, especially in the UK, which was most severely 
affected (6–10). Since then, it has been a tool for evaluating con-
trol strategies in hypothetical scenarios, and supporting decisions 
when elaborating contingency plans (11–17).
Davis animal disease spread (DADS) is a stochastic simu-
lation model developed at the University of Davis (11) and 
programmed in R (18). The model was later adapted by the 
Technical University of Denmark (DTU) to simulate the 
spread of FMD using different control measures (12, 13, 19). 
The resulting DTU-DADS model has two main components. 
Between-herd spread is simulated using an agent-based model 
that simulates FMD spread through direct and indirect con-
tact. Within-herd spread is modeled as a compartmental model 
based on the work of Carpenter et al. (20), and parameterized 
following (21), as detailed in Ref. (12). Several options for 
outbreak control have been set up in the DTU-DADS model, 
which can be enforced in specific herds, buffer zones, or fol-
lowing contact tracing. The model explicitly takes into account 
the resources available and herds are queued if resources are 
exceeded.
We used a simulation model to study potential outbreak 
scenarios in Sweden in case of an introduction of FMD, assess 
their expected magnitude, and evaluate control strategy options. 
The model developed is a result of the partnership between 
epidemiologists from the Swedish National Veterinary Institute 
(SVA) and the Danish team that developed the spread model 
DTU-DADS at the Technical University of Denmark (DTU). SVA 
and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (SJV) worked together to 
define the main questions to be addressed, and the needed sup-
port to the decision-making process of drafting a contingency 
plan. Emphasis was given to the comparative effect of different 
control measures.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
The DTU-DADS spread model [version 0.15 (19)] was adapted 
by feeding the model with specific Swedish data, and by adjusting 
the R codes when needed. All model details are discussed below, 
and a full description of the model and parameters, including 
original descriptions from the DTU-DADS model when needed 
[transcribed from Ref. (12), including updates], are available in 
the Presentation S1 in Supplementary Material. Model param-
eterization focused on FMDV serotype O, the same that caused 
the European outbreaks of 2001, and which is the most widely 
distributed and prevalent FMDV serotype (4).
An overview of the stochastic events simulated in the model 
is given in Figure 1. Events are simulated in discrete time steps 
of 1 day. Simulations run from the day of the virus introduction 
until all infected herds are detected, or up to 365  days if the 
outbreak is not controlled.
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TaBle 1 | List of all inputs to the Swedish foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) spread model.
Parameter source Valuea
FMD 
transmission 
parameters
Probability of transmission when an infected 
animal is transferred to a new herd
DTU-DADS (12) Pert (0.95, 0.98, 1)a
Probability of spread by a truck carrying PIGS 
to slaughter
DTU-DADS (12) Before detection: Pert (0.005, 0.175, 0.35)
After detection: reduction of 20%
Probability of spread by a truck carrying 
RUMINANTS (cattle or small ruminants) to 
slaughter
DTU-DADS (12) Same as a medium contact risk (see below)
Probability of spread by a low risk contact 
(feedstuff trucks, rendering trucks, technicians, 
visitors, and milk tank trucks)
DTU-DADS (12) RUMINANTS: Pert (0.005, 0.175, 0.35)
PIGS: Pert (n, 0.005, 0.1, 0.35)
Probability of spread by a medium risk contact 
(persons visiting a farm and expected to visit 
another farm after, for example, veterinarians, 
artificial inseminators, and milk controllers)
DTU-DADS (12) Depends on the herd type.
RUMINANTS: Pert (0.1, 0.5, 0.9)
PIGS (all specified herd types): Pert (0.05, 0.2, 0.9)
PIGS (production type unknown—classified as “others”):  
Pert (0.1, 0.35, 0.9)
Local spread DTU-DADS (12) 95% within 100 m, 1.2% up to 1 km, 0.4% in 2 km, and 
0.1% in 3 km
Disease spread within a herd once an infected 
animal is introduced
DTU-DADS (12) Latent period: Poisson distribution with a λ of 3.59, 3.07,  
and 4.79 for cattle, swine, and sheep, respectively
Subclinical period: Poisson distribution with λ of 2.04,  
2.27, and 2.16
Time to detection if clinical signs are present DTU-DADS (12) If not detected due to surveillance or tracing, the probability  
of detection due to clinical signs per day for cattle and  
pigs: 0.085, 0.17, 0.51, 0.19, 0.06, and 0.07 for days from  
1 to 6, respectively. For sheep herds the probabilities for  
days from 1 to 9 were 0.02, 0.04, 0.27, 0.29, 0.14, 0.12, 
0.08, 0.05,5 and 0.12, respectively
Table 1 lists all model parameters and their sources. Further 
details for each parameter are given in Presentation S1 in 
Supplementary Material.
All disease transmission parameters that were thought to 
be readily applicable from the Danish to the Swedish livestock 
population, or to be independent from the host population 
(intrinsic pathogen properties) were kept as set up in the DTU-
DADS model, as explained individually for the parameters in 
Table 1 and Presentation S1 in Supplementary Material.
To adapt the model to the Swedish livestock population, 
specific data were collected for all FMD susceptible herds in 
Sweden, including animal movement data, as shown in Table 1 
and detailed in Presentation S1 in Supplementary Material. The 
direct and indirect contact networks among these herds were 
also characterized. Animal and people movements were charac-
terized and modeled according to herd type, but independently 
for two main geographical regions in Sweden: North and South. 
This was to account for the lower farm density in the north of 
Sweden.
The model considers each group of animals from the same 
species, within the same farm, as one herd, and models herds indi-
vidually; if a farm contains cattle and pigs, for example, cattle and 
pig herds are modeled individually. A farm ID is used to keep track 
of herds in the same farm, and enforce control measures in all herds 
within a farm equally. If for instance one of the herds is detected 
as infected, all herds belonging to the same farm are culled. A high 
probability of local area spread within 100 m is used to account for 
horizontal transmission between herds in the same farm.
Outbreaks were modeled under different scenarios of disease 
introduction, to assess the effect of different population param-
eters in the development of the outbreak. In each of 21 base 
scenarios, outbreaks were set to start in a herd of a particular 
type, and in each iteration, the first infected herd was randomly 
selected among all herds of that type. Seven scenarios had infec-
tion seeded in the south of Sweden, in one specific herd type (dairy 
cattle, cattle herds without milking activity, sow herds, fattening 
pig herds, weaners, multiplying pig herds, or small ruminant 
herds); another seven scenarios were related to the same herd 
types, but seeded in the north of Sweden; and finally herds were 
chosen based on the frequency of direct animal contacts in a year 
(low, medium or high contact network cattle herds; low, medium 
or high contact network pig herds; or high contact network small 
ruminant herds). In addition, spread was also evaluated when 2, 
3, or 4 initial seeds were set (number of infected herds to start the 
epidemic), all in cattle herds. The evaluated scenarios are listed 
in Table 2.
Base scenarios were simulated using a fixed control strategy 
(here we use “control strategy” to denote a specified collec-
tion of “control measures”). In these base control scenarios the 
mandatory conditions determined in the EU Council Directive 
2003/85/EC were implemented, and in addition a 3-day national 
standstill:
(Continued )
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Parameter source Valuea
Swedish animal 
population
Cattle herds:
 (1) geographical coordinates
 (2) herd size
 (3) type of herds
CDB database; and Swedish 
Salmonella surveillance (Estelle 
Ågren, personal communication)
A total of 23,247 cattle herds were classified into milking 
(3,427 herds) and not milking. See the Supplementary 
Material for a map and summary statistics
Swine herds:
 (1) geographical coordinates
 (2) herd size
 (3) type of herds
Swedish Board of Agriculture 
database of farms; and personal 
communication with “Jord På Trynet”
A total of 955 herds were classified into: satellite, weaners, 
integrated, fattening, KRAV integrated and non-integrated, 
multipliers, and others. See the Supplementary Material for  
a map and summary statistics
Sheep/goats herds:
 (1) geographical coordinates
 (2) herd size
 (3) type of herds
Swedish Board of Agriculture 
database
A total of 14,885 herds were classified into hobby  
(15,157) and commercial. See the Supplementary  
Material for a map and summary statistics
Probability of sending animals to slaughter National movement registry  
(CDB database)
Calculated for each herd individually, per day, based on  
actual movement data
Probability of sending animals to other herds National movement registry  
(CDB database)
Calculated for each herd individually, per day, based on  
actual movement data
Expected distance between herds moving 
animals and when sending animals to 
slaughter
National movement registry  
(CDB database)
Calculated separately for cattle, swine, and sheep, for  
regions North and South of Sweden, based on actual 
movement data from 2013. See the Supplementary  
Material for summary statistics
Probability of sending animals from each  
herd type to every other herd type
National movement registry  
(CDB database)
Calculated separately for cattle, swine, and sheep,  
for regions North and South of Sweden, based on  
actual movement data from 2013. See the  
Supplementary Material for summary statistics
Average of medium risk contacts coming to  
the farm, each day
Calculated based on data available 
from Ref. (22)
Poisson distribution λ=
Milking cattle herds: 0.1391881
Non-milking cattle herds: 0.01178143
PIG herds: 0.03535898
SHEEP herds: 0.01377529
Average of low risk contacts coming to the 
farm, each day
Calculated based on data available 
from Ref. (22)
Poisson distribution λ=
Milking cattle herds: 0.0904619
Non-milking cattle herds: 0.05215315
Milk tank truck: 0.11 (0.4297846*25%)
PIG herds: 0.0821647
SHEEP herds: 0.068445975
Probability of medium risk contacts going  
from each herd type to every other herd type
DTU-DADS (12) “Medium risk contacts from cattle herds were modeled to 
most often have another cattle herd as the destination herd 
(88%), while we modeled 60 and 40% of the medium risk 
contacts to go to other herd types (cattle or sheep) from 
hobby and non-hobby pig herds, respectively. From sheep 
herds, we assumed that 50% of the movements were to other 
sheep herds, while the other 50% were to pig or cattle herds.” 
Please note that in the Swedish model the herd category 
equivalent to “hobby” was “others,” which grouped all herds 
without commercial production type information available
Distance between farms visited in the same  
day by low and medium risk contacts
An estimate for Sweden lacks, therefore we used the same 
distances calculated for the movement of animals
Distance between the farm and the 
slaughterhouse
National movement registry  
(CDB database)
Calculated separately for cattle, swine, and sheep, for  
regions North and South of Sweden, based on actual 
movement data from 2013 (CBD database)
Number of herds visited by a slaughter truck,  
in average, in one trip to the slaughter house
DTU-DADS (12) CATTLE: 5 before detection, and 2 after detection
PIGS: 1–7, most likely 1 (see specific section for details)
SHEEP: modeled as a Poisson distribution with mean 1.5, 
and 1.2 after detection
Region Included in the model by SVA, 
separating North (listed in the  
range) from South (all others)
North region includes the following Swedish territories: 
Värmland, Dalarna, Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Jämtland, 
Västerbotten, and Norrbotten
TaBle 1 | Continued
(Continued )
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Parameter source Valuea
Start Seeding herd Swedish Board of Agriculture Chosen depending on the outbreak scenario (see text and 
Table 2)
Disease control 
scenarios
Day the epidemic is detected DTU-DADS (12) Default values: 21 days
Total range evaluated: 17–35 days
Survey capacity (number of herds that can  
be visited per day for surveillance)
Swedish Board of Agriculture 40 is the default value, ranges of 20–100 were evaluated
Culling capacity per day Swedish Board of Agriculture Default values: 1,250 ruminants and 2,750 pigs  
Total range evaluated: 500–3,000 ruminants; 500–3,000 
swine
Vaccination capacity per day Swedish Board of Agriculture Default values: 1,000 ruminants and 5,000 pigs  
Total range evaluated: 500–3,000 ruminants; 3,000–30,000 
swine
Control zones DTU-DADS (12), and in accordance 
to EU Council Directive 2003/85/EC
Protection: 3 km from an infected herd
Surveillance: 3–10 km
Number of days to revisit a herd in the 
surveillance zone
DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC 14 days
Delay for the second visit in case a herd 
is located in the intersection of multiple 
surveillance zones
DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC 7 days
Duration of the surveillance zone DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC 30 days
Movement ban DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC Ban on any animal movement in the country, 3 or 7 days
98% effective [Pert (0.95, 0.98, 1)]
Time necessary to trace all movements  
from infected herds
Swedish Board of Agriculture 1 day
Risk contacts (herds that received animals 
from infected herds)
DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC Compulsory depopulation or put under surveillance only
Probability of tracing contacts (back and 
forward) of an infected herd
Swedish Board of Agriculture 98% of tracing and 100% of detecting FMD if the herd  
is infected
Probability of tracing indirect, medium risk 
contacts of an infected herd
Swedish Board of Agriculture 80% of tracing and 99.9% of detecting FMD if the herd  
is infected
Probability of tracing indirect, low risk contacts 
of an infected herd
Swedish Board of Agriculture 50% of tracing and 99.9% of detecting FMD if the herd  
is infected
Ring depopulation DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC Radius: 500, 1,000, 1,500 m
Enforced: 1 or 14 days after detection of the epidemic;  
or enforced after 10, 20, or 30 herds are detected
Ring vaccination DTU-DADS (12) and 2003/85/EC Radius: 1,000, 2,000, 3,000 m 
Enforced: 7 or 14 days after detection of the epidemic;  
or enforced after 10, 20, or 30 herds are detected
Vaccination efficiency DTU-DADS (12) Pert (0.39, 0.42, 0.47)
Vaccination immunity built up DTU-DADS (12) See appropriate section for detailed number per day
Behavior changes after detection Swedish National Veterinary Institute 
(SVA)
Medium risk contacts would reduce with a probability Pert 
(0.7, 0.8, 0.95) and low risk contacts Pert (0.2,0.3,0.5)
Further details for each parameter are given in the Supplementary Material.
aProbability distribution used (minimum, most likely, and maximum).
TaBle 1 | Continued
• Culling of all animals in detected FMD-positive farms and 
their high risk contacts (farms that received animals from the 
infected ones).
• Establishing of a 3 km protection zone and a 10 km surveil-
lance zone around every detected farm. Susceptible animals’ 
movement prohibition is kept in these zones for 30  days, a 
period during which all herds are visited for clinical inspection 
twice, starting from the protection zone. More details are given 
in Presentation S1 in Supplementary Material (Section 1.4.2 in 
Supplementary Material).
• 3-day national standstill, i.e., ban of all susceptible animal 
movements after first detection.
A reduction in the number of indirect contacts among farms 
after detection of the outbreak was also enforced, as per param-
eters listed in Table  1. The standard detection day used in the 
DTU-DADS model (21 days) was set, and the estimated surveil-
lance capacity in Sweden is listed in Table 1.
After the effects of different scenarios of disease introduction 
were evaluated with this base control strategy, one of the base 
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TaBle 2 | List of all evaluated scenarios of disease spread and control measures.
Disease seeding/spread settings # of seed 
herds
Disease control settings
species herd characteristics region
Base control scenarios Cattle Milking South 1 Base control strategy:
• Three days ban of all susceptible livestock movements after first detection (standstill)
• Establishing of a 3 km protection zone and a 10 km surveillance zone around every 
detected herd, with all herds within zones visited for clinical inspection
• Culling of all animals in detected positive farms and their high risk contacts (farms that 
received animals from the infected ones)
Not milking
Pigs Sows
Fattening
Weaners
Multipliers
Small ruminants Any
Cattle Milking North 1
Not milking
Pigs Sows
Fattening
Weaners
Multipliers
Small ruminants Any
Cattle Low trade frequency Both regions 1
Medium trade frequency
High trade frequency
Pigs Low trade frequency
Medium trade frequency
High trade frequency
Small ruminants High trade frequency
Cattle All herds South 2
Cattle 3
Cattle 4
Effect of alternative 
control measures
Cattle Medium trade frequency Both regions 1 Earlier detection (days 17–21)
Late detection (days 21–25)
Lowered surveillance resources  
(20 herd visits/day)
Increased surveillance resources (100 herd visits/day)
Standstill increased to 7 days
Standstill of 3 days, but NO reduction in the movement of people after detection
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced 1 day after 
detection of the outbreak
Culling capacity decreased to 500 ruminants and 500 swine per day
Culling capacity increased to 3,000 ruminants and 3,000 swine per day
Depopulation in a radius of 500 m, enforced 1 day after detection of the outbreak
Depopulation in a radius of 1,500 m, enforced 1 day after detection of the outbreak
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m, enforced 7 days after detection of the outbreak
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m, after 14 days 
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m, enforced after 10 detected herds are detected
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m, 20 detected herds
Depopulation in a radius of 1,000 m, 30 detected herds
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced 1 day after 
outbreak detection. All vaccinated animals culled at the end
Same as previous scenario, but vaccination capacity reduced to 500 ruminants and 3,000 
swine per day
(Continued )
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Disease seeding/spread settings # of seed 
herds
Disease control settings
species herd characteristics region
Vaccination capacity increased to 3,000 ruminants and 30,000 swine per day
Vaccination in a radius of 2,000 m, enforced 1 day after outbreak detection. All vaccinated 
animals culled at the end
Vaccination in a radius of 3,000 m, enforced 1 day after outbreak detection. All vaccinated 
animals culled at the end
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced 7 days after 
outbreak detected
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced 14 days after 
outbreak detected
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced after 10 detected 
herds
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced after 20 detected 
herds
Vaccination in a radius of 1,000 m around every infected farm, enforced after 30 detected 
herds
Sensitivity analysis using 
worst-case scenarios
Tested for each 
of 3 “worst-case 
scenarios”:
 (A) Cattle milking 
herd, any region
 (B) Pig herd with 
high trading 
frequency
 (C) 4 seed cattle 
herds in the 
South of 
Sweden (any 
herd type)
Capacity of only 20 surveillance visits per day
Limited culling resources (500 ruminants and 500 swine)
Effectiveness of standstill (prohibition of moving animals in the whole country for 3 days)—
reduction of 15% and then 40% on the originally set effectiveness
Effect of detection on the behavior of people (reduction in indirect contacts between 
farms)—reduction of 15% and then 40% on the originally set effectiveness
Time to trace contacts increased to 3 days
Probability of tracing direct contacts—reduction of 15% and then 40% on the originally set 
effectiveness
Probability of tracing indirect contacts—reduction of 15% and then 40% on the originally 
set effectiveness
Probability of detecting traced contacts if indeed positive—reduction of 15% and then 40% 
on the originally set effectiveness
Effectiveness of enforcing control measures in the detected farms—reduction of 15% and 
then 40% on the originally set effectiveness
Effectiveness of enforcing control measures in the surveillance zone—reduction of 15% 
and then 40% on the originally set effectiveness
Late detection: 28 and 35 days
Chaos scenarios Cattle All herds South 4 • Base control strategy
• Detection only on day 28 after introduction
• All the control measures listed in the sensitivity analysis above with effectiveness reduced 
by 15% compared to the values considered realistic for Sweden
• Surveillance capacity and culling capacity were kept normal (40 surveillance teams, 
culling capacity of 1,500 ruminants, and 3,300 swine)
TaBle 2 | Continued
(Continued )
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control scenarios was chosen to evaluate the effect of applying 
alternative control strategies. The choice was based on the evalu-
ation of the base control scenarios and is described in the results. 
Alternative disease control measures were evaluated, using a range 
of parameters listed in Table 1 (see Table 2 for a list of the evalu-
ated scenarios):
• Preemptive depopulation (ring culling), for different ring radii, 
and triggered when a determined number of detected infected 
herds was reached, or outbreak control was not reached after 
a number of days;
• Ring vaccination (vaccination to cull), using different ring 
radii, and also dependent on the number of detected infected 
herds reached, or the outbreak length.
Based on the results of previous scenarios, three worst-case 
scenarios were chosen. Sensitivity analysis was carried out in 
these worst-case scenarios to ensure that the effect of different 
parameters could be more easily identified. Model sensitivity was 
evaluated against a range of values for the detection day and the 
effectiveness of the alternative control measures, and variation in 
the amount of surveillance resources available (daily survey and 
culling capacity, see Tables 1 and 2).
Finally, to confirm the conclusions drawn from the previous 
steps, all disease spread conditions determined to have high 
impact in the outbreak size were manipulated to exaggerate the 
worst-case scenarios, and create a chaos scenario. “Chaos” was 
assumed to be a consequence of a very high infection pressure 
to start with (four infected herds to start the epidemic, all in the 
south of Sweden and close to the Danish border), and a cumula-
tive number of failures in the effectiveness of all control measures 
applied. These conditions were intended to mimic an epidemic 
that starts and develops with a much greater magnitude than 
expected, compared to the typical outbreak scenarios modeled 
previously, or an epidemic that gets out of control. The effective-
ness of specific control measures were challenged against this 
chaotic scenario (see Table 2).
Table 2 lists every scenario evaluated. For each scenario, the 
following outputs are reported:
• Epidemic duration, in days, defined as the day from first detec-
tion until the day when the last infected herd was detected 
(note that control would then still continue until all infected 
farms are culled and surveillance and protection zones are 
lifted);
• Total number of herds infected during the course of the 
epidemic;
• Total number of herds visited by surveillance teams (herds put 
in surveillance queue due to being direct or indirect contacts 
of an infected farm, or for being in a surveillance zone);
• Total number of herds culled, and total number of animal in 
these herds;
• Total number of herds vaccinated, and total number of animals 
in these herds.
Ten-thousand iterations of scenario 1 showed that output 
medians and interquartile ranges were stable after 500 iterations, 
but the maximum varied due to longer epidemics observed in 
individual iterations when more repetitions were run. As a 
9Dórea et al. FMD Outbreak Control in Sweden
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org July 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 118
com promise between achieving higher variability and keeping com-
pu tational time manageable, 1,000 iterations were simulated for 
each scenario.
The progression of scenarios described above focused on 
testing the model sensitivity to the control measures. To also 
evaluate the structure of the model, and the impact of the param-
eters that were imported from the Danish model, the transmis-
sion parameters listed in Table 1 were also subjected to sensitivity 
analysis. The probability of transmission associated with direct 
contact, slaughter trucks, low risk contact, and medium risk 
contact were increased and reduced to up to 20%. The effect of 
local spread was also subjected to sensitivity analysis, by remov-
ing any local spread that was not between herds in the same farm, 
or increasing the probabilities in radius from 1 to 3 km up to five 
times.
resUlTs
In general, the results showed that an FMD outbreak in Sweden 
would most likely be small and of short duration, and that base 
control measures as specified in the EU legislation, comple-
mented with a 3-day national standstill of all susceptible animals 
movements, would be enough for bringing the outbreak under 
control. Considering the 24 base scenarios evaluated, the median 
epidemic duration (time from detection of the first infected herd 
to the day in which the last herd was detected) was 3–15 days, and 
the median number of infected herds was 2–19 (with a median 
number of culled animals of 46–4,136). The 95% percentiles were 
for an epidemic of 20 days, involving 15 infected herds and cull-
ing nearly 5,000 animals.
Summary statistics for all the scenarios evaluated are presented 
in Table S2-1 in Presentation S2 in Supplementary Material and 
Table 1, and relevant results and conclusions are presented and 
discussed by group of scenarios below. Please note that epidemic 
duration is counted from the detection day. Simulations in which 
the epidemic was considered to die off before detection resulted 
in negative epidemic duration.
The results of the base scenarios (Figure 2) showed that the 
region where the outbreak started (North versus South) had little 
effect on the expected size and duration of the epidemic. By 
looking in detail into individual iterations, and mapping every 
modeled transmission event, it was possible to conclude that 
this was because epidemics starting in the North eventually 
spread to the South through long distance movements. The main 
FigUre 2 | Results for the base scenarios with outbreaks starting in the South, North, or based on number of contacts (trade), per herd type and herd species. 
Individual box plots represent the summary of 1,000 iterations for each scenario. All scenarios are detailed in Table 2, but in short: Milk = cattle herds delivering 
milk; NotMilk = herds without any reported milking activity; Sows = sow pools; Fatt = fattening pig herds; Wean = weaners pig herds; Breed = multiplier pig herds; 
SmallRum = small ruminant herds (sheep, goats, or both).
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difference between epidemics starting in the North and South 
are the resources needed to control the outbreak, as farm density 
is lower in the North, and therefore a smaller number of farms 
ends up in the surveillance zones. The median number of farms 
that needed to be visited by surveillance teams (direct contacts 
of infected farms, or farms within the surveillance zones) was 
106–381 for the base control scenarios in which epidemic started 
in the South (95% percentile = 448–915) and 49–195 in the North 
(95% = 188–734).
The effect of species and herd types seemed to be a direct effect 
of the contact network structure for each herd type. Epidemics 
starting in sheep/goats herds were generally smaller, due to a 
lower probability of direct (animal movement) and indirect 
(people movement) contacts. Cattle herds had very different 
results depending on whether it was a dairy herd or not, reflecting 
the larger number of indirect contacts expected daily in herds 
with milking animals. Outbreaks starting in pig herds in general 
resulted in an average epidemic size between milking and non-
milking cattle herds. The main impact of starting epidemics in 
pig herds was the higher number of animals that were culled, a 
reflection of their much larger herd size (see Presentation S1 in 
Supplementary Material for herd statistics). As epidemics were 
generally small, with only a few herds being culled, the size of 
the seeding herd had high impact on the total number of culled 
animals. Only the number of animals culled is shown in Figure 2, 
since the number of herds culled was almost always the same 
as the number of infected herds (Table S2-1 in Supplementary 
Material).
The number of pig herds in Sweden is very small, and as a 
result, epidemics that started in pig herds were ultimately driven 
by spread among cattle herds, as we could conclude from extensive 
analysis of the base control scenarios. Since cattle herds seemed 
to be driving spread, and the contact network (direct and indirect 
contacts) was the main driver of the epidemic size, a “typical 
outbreak scenario” was chosen as one starting in a cattle herd 
in the south of Sweden, with an average number of yearly direct 
contacts. This scenario was chosen to test the effect of alternative 
control measures, as shown in Table 2.
The main result for all scenarios designed to evaluate the 
effect of alternative control measures (listed in Table  2) was a 
remarkable lack of variation between these scenarios, as dem-
onstrated for a few selected scenarios in Figure  3, and for all 
scenarios in Presentation S2 in Supplementary Material (Figure 
S2-1 in Supplementary Material). Late detection (modeled as a 
pert distribution from 21 to 25 days, with most likely 23 days) 
had an effect in increasing the epidemic duration and the maxi-
mum observed number of infected herds, but not increasing the 
median number of infected herds. In all the different scenarios 
simulated the median number of infected herds was 3, and the 
95% percentile ranged from 12 to 15 for all scenarios but late 
FigUre 3 | Results of selected scenarios comparing alternative control measures and amount of resources available. Scenario labels are as presented in Table 2. 
Individual box plots represent the summary of 1,000 iterations for each scenario. Red lines mark the median for all the iterations in the “typical outbreak scenario” 
against which all measures are compared (first box plot), and the dashed lines represent the 25 and 75% percentiles for that scenario.
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detection, in which the 95% percentile for the number of infected 
herds was 19. Ring culling had only a marginal effect in reducing 
the epidemic duration, but not the number of herds infected. 
Ring vaccination did not reduce the epidemic duration nor the 
number of herds infected.
The “typical outbreak scenario” was examined on a daily basis, 
focusing on the number of herds put in the surveillance list daily, 
in comparison to the number of available teams. The results 
(Figure S2-3 in Supplementary Material, Presentation 2) showed 
that the number of herds to be visited per day only exceeded 
the capacity of surveillance immediately after detection in the 
median outbreak, with herds waiting at most a day to be visited 
in the cases when the outbreak was controlled within a week. 
Epidemics in iterations placed above the 90% percentile could 
take up to 19 days to be controlled. In those cases the number of 
days a herd would have to wait to be visited could be as high as 
14, with daily medians ranging from 0 to 8.
Sensitivity analysis were performed using three “worst-case 
scenarios” to magnify the observed effectiveness of control 
measures, which could have been hard to observe in the small 
outbreak sizes associated with the “typical outbreak scenario.” The 
sensitivity analysis showed that these results were robust for the 
range of parameters tested in the sensitivity analysis (see sensi-
tivity analysis section in Table 2), except for one: the day of detec-
tion (Figure S2-2 in Supplementary Material, Presentation 2). 
Table  2 lists the 19 scenarios evaluated based on worst-case 
scenario A (cattle scenario with highest expected epidemic size 
and duration—starting in a milking herd). If we exclude the two 
scenarios in which late detection was tested, the median number 
of infected herds for all other 17 scenarios ranged from 7 to 8, and 
the median epidemic duration was always 11 days (from detection 
of the first until detection of the last infected herd). Each week 
of delayed detection doubled the median number of infected 
herds, resulting in medians 16 and 32 herds for the scenarios of 
detection on days 28 and 35, respectively. The median epidemic 
duration for the late detection scenarios were 14 and 18 days.
For worst-case scenario B (starting in a pig herd with a great 
number of direct contacts), the median number of infected herds 
in the 17 scenarios tested with detection on day 21 (but varying 
the efficacy of various control measures) ranged 10–11, and the 
median epidemic duration was always 13 days. Detection on days 
28 and 35 increased the median number of infected herds to 30 
and 61, respectively, and resulted in a median epidemic duration 
of 17 and 21 days.
When the epidemic was seeded in four cattle herds at the same 
time (worst-case scenario C), but detection was not delayed, 
the median number of infected herds in all sensitivity analysis 
scenarios evaluated varied between 19 and 20 herds, with median 
epidemic duration varying between 15 and 16 days. Detection on 
days 28 and 35 increased the median number of infected herds 
to 40 and 87, respectively, and resulted in a median epidemic 
duration of 19 and 24 days.
Sensitivity analysis for the transmission parameters showed 
that the results were very robust to changes in punctual transmis-
sion parameters. As for the previous analysis, this was particularly 
true in scenarios with low expected number of infected herds. 
In the “typical outbreak scenario,” for instance, changes of up to 
20% in the probability of transmission following direct contact 
did not change the median number of infected herds. Evaluation 
of the percentage of all transmission events, over all iterations 
in that scenario, showed that about 45% were a result of direct 
contact, and 5% of movement to slaughter. This resulted in 
robustness of the model to changes in the probabilities of trans-
mission associated with slaughter movements. About 28% of 
the transmission events were due to indirect contact (low and 
medium risk contacts), and 22% due to local spread. The prob-
ability of local spread within 100 m was kept high in all scenarios 
to ensure transmission between herds within the same farm. As 
expected, increases in the probability of transmission for other 
distances resulted in a higher number of infected herds, but a 
fivefold increase in the probability of transmission within 1 km, 
for instance, only increased the median number of infected herds 
in the typical scenario by about two herds.
Based on the results of scenarios presented above, a cutoff of 
10 detected infected herds was set as a decision point for when 
authorities should start considering that the outbreak was not 
being brought under control. In all base scenarios the expected 
number of infected herds was under 10, and only higher in sce-
narios with multiple starting seeds or failures in the effectiveness 
of control measures. The effect of deciding to implement ring 
culling or vaccination after this threshold was reached was evalu-
ated in the chaos scenarios, and results are presented in Figure 4.
The scenario with infection seeded in four cattle herds in the 
south of Sweden at the same time, and detection after 4 weeks 
(base chaos scenario), resulted in a median number of 42 infected 
herds (95% percentile of 83 herds), and an epidemic duration of 
20 days between detection of the first and last herd (95% percentile 
at 33 days). This is assuming that all base control measures would 
be applied, and the surveillance capacity would be at a regular 
level, but all applied control measures would be 15% less effective 
than in the base scenarios (for instance effectiveness of enforce-
ment of the standstill, and effectiveness of tracing). Increasing the 
period of standstill was not effective in reducing the number of 
infected herds nor the epidemic duration. Ring vaccination was 
not effective in reducing the median number of herds infected, 
although the median epidemic duration was reduced by 1  day 
(median 19 and 95% percentile of 28 days).
The implementation of preemptive depopulation of all 
susceptible animals, in a radius of 1 km around every infected 
farm, would reduce the median epidemic duration in the chaos 
scenarios by 4 days (median 16 days; 95% percentile at 26 days). 
The median number of infected herds was reduced to 38 (95% 
percentile at 72 herds). As a consequence of the reduction in the 
number of infected herds (fewer surveillance zones to be estab-
lished), the median number of visited herds was reduced from 
1,075 in the base chaos scenario to 875 when culling was applied 
(95% percentiles at 1,439 and 1,327, respectively). The median 
number of culled herds, however, was increased from 42 to 86 
(95% percentiles at 82 and 179, respectively), and the median 
number of animals culled from 6,682 to 12,789 (95% percentiles 
at 23,002 and 29,897, respectively, for the scenarios without and 
with preemptive depopulation).
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FigUre 4 | Results of spread under a scenario of “chaos,” with only base control measures in place, and with implementation of additional controls. All scenarios 
are further detailed in Table 2. Individual box plots represent the summary of 1,000 iterations for each scenario. Red lines mark the median for all the iterations in the 
scenario with base control measures (first box plot), and the dashed lines represent the 25 and 75% percentiles for that scenario.
DiscUssiOn
A disease spread model was adapted to the Swedish livestock 
structure to evaluate the effect of different control strategies and 
inform FMD preparedness in Sweden. Results showed that an 
FMD introduction in Sweden will most likely spread slowly and 
be readily contained with adoption of a control strategy combin-
ing the control measures required in the current EU legislation 
for the control of FMD (Council Directive 2003/85/EC), and a 
national standstill. The detailed control strategy is: a 3-day prohi-
bition of all movements of susceptible animals after first detection 
(standstill), 3 km protection zones and 10 km surveillance zones 
around every detected farm, and culling of all animals in detected 
farms and their high risk contacts.
The results of the model are not meant to be interpreted as a 
strictly quantitative representation of reality. The application of 
models to decision-making, in general, should serve primarily 
as a means for comparing the effectiveness of different control 
measures, and assessing the comparative magnitude of various 
scenarios to understand the main outbreak drivers and the most 
important control targets (16). While we do not expect the model 
to tell us the exact number of herds that would be affected by 
a FMD outbreak in Sweden, for instance, the range of results 
evaluated gave us the expected dimension of the problem, in 
particular when compared among scenarios within this work, 
and also when compared to results from other countries.
Our results are a direct contrast to those observed when 
the same model was applied in Denmark, where the adoption 
of additional measures such as protective vaccination and ring 
depopulation were concluded to be cost-effective on most scenar-
ios of spread (12). The contrasting conclusions, however, increase 
confidence that the results observed are not an artifact of the 
model, and highlight the impact that the specific characteristics of 
the Swedish livestock structure had in the model. In comparison 
to Denmark, Sweden is characterized by a low density of farms, 
with much smaller herd sizes on average, and most particularly, 
a small pig industry (23–25). Many farms also have very limited 
trade of live animals (26). In Finland, where cattle and pig farms 
are also typically family owned and small in size compared to the 
rest of Europe, and where the livestock industry has also been 
decreasing in recent years, results of a risk assessment published 
in 2011 were similar to the ones presented here (27). The authors 
concluded that a possible FMD outbreak in Finland would be 
controlled within 5 weeks of introduction, affecting on average 
four farms, and even the larger expected outbreaks would involve 
few farms and be promptly controlled.
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Another difference to the original Danish model is that a 
reduction in the number of indirect contacts between farms after 
outbreak detection was assumed. The assumption that people 
would reduce all unnecessary traffic from and to their farms, once 
an outbreak is known to be occurring in the country, is based on 
feedback from farmers (28). It is also informed by the experience 
of our group through several outbreaks (of diseases other than 
FMD) and in particular a change in behavior noted in the country 
during the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001.
The model was scrutinized by individual evaluation of multiple 
iterations per scenario, and mapping of every modeled transmis-
sion event, including the mode of transmission (direct or indirect 
contact). This confirmed that epidemic size was mainly driven 
by infected cattle farms. It also confirmed the expected effect of 
long distance movements in keeping North and South of Sweden 
highly inter-connected (29).
The choice of a predefined detection date (21 days after seed-
ing the infection) was based on extensive review of information 
from previous outbreaks performed by the Danish team that 
developed the DTU-DADS model (12, 13). Complementary 
work (not presented in this paper) trying to estimate the detec-
tion date based on the probability of animals showing clinical 
signs, and the documented efficacy of passive surveillance in 
Sweden, suggested that 21  days is a conservative assumption. 
Relaxation of this assumption, i.e., assuming a later detection, 
was the single parameter with the most impact in the epidemic 
size. Sensitivity analysis showed that each week of later detection 
generally doubled the expected total number of infected herds 
by the time the epidemic is controlled. The epidemic duration 
(i.e., from day of detection to day of detection of last infected 
herd), however, showed remarkable robustness when compared 
to the number of infected herds, and the median epidemic dura-
tion was increased by only 3–4 days when detection was delayed 
by 1 week, and another 4–5 days for an extra week of delay. This 
highlights that surveillance resources were rarely exceeded, 
and the base control measures modeled were sufficient to cope 
with outbreaks of dimensions much larger than what was consid-
ered the “typical outbreak scenario” for Sweden.
The DTU-DADS model (in the version used to carry out this 
work, 0.15) did not allow adjustment of the surveillance capac-
ity along the outbreak, that is, surveillance resources are fixed 
for the whole period of the epidemic. The surveillance capacity 
used in this model was based on what the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture considered feasible to gather in the first 1–3 days 
after detection of the first suspicion (and therefore arguably 
at the same time or shortly after confirmation). In reality, the 
number of surveillance resources could be increased after a few 
days of outbreak control. In the “typical outbreak scenario,” only 
in exceptional epidemics the number of herds that needed to be 
visited for clinical surveillance was greater than the number of 
teams available for field visits (see Figure S2-3 in Supplementary 
Material), and a herd queue was generated. The culling capacity, 
however, was never exceeded. Most of the farms in the model 
had herds smaller than the daily culling capacity per team 
declared by the Swedish Board of Agriculture and used in the 
model. Moreover, the number of herds that needed to be culled 
in the same day was very small.
The relatively small expected outbreak size and low demand for 
surveillance resources in all scenarios resulted in a high observed 
efficacy of the base control measures. In all evaluated scenarios, even 
the most chaotic ones, an FMD epidemic is expected to be controlled 
within 3 weeks from the detection of the first case. The number of herds 
infected is small, and most of the surveillance effort needed will be to 
visit farms that fall into the surveillance zones around each infected 
farm, to rule out infection. Surveillance capacity was not often exceeded. 
In epidemics that took longer than 2 weeks to control, herds could 
eventually wait longer than 2  days to be visited by a surveillance 
queue. However, herds in queue were those that needed to be visited 
because they fell within the surveillance zone. Suspected farms and 
high risk contacts are given priority in the surveillance visiting list, 
and therefore can be visited on the day of detection/tracing, as long 
as the number of infected herds and their direct contacts is below 
the number of surveillance teams, as was the case in all scenarios 
evaluated.
The base control measures were not only predicted to be 
effective, they were also robust. Reductions of up to 40% in the 
efficacy of a single measure can be compensated if everything 
else is assumed to be working properly. The number of infected 
herds was more sensitive to failures in control than the expected 
epidemic duration, due to the reasons discussed above.
Direct contact and local spread were the main modes of 
disease transmission. The central role of direct contact transmis-
sion is expected (30). In this model, the high percentage of local 
spread transmission is a consequence of the way the model 
was set up. Individual herds are modeled independently, and 
transmission between herds in the same farm is enforced by 
setting a high probability of local transmission within 100 m. The 
model was obviously sensitive to the set probability of transmission 
for other distance radius. In this model transmission events are 
modeled individually, and the addition of a local spread component 
was meant only to reflect any residual transmission not accounted 
for after modeling direct and indirect contacts explicitly.
The worst-case scenarios observed were those related to 
multiple introductions at the same time, and delayed detection 
of introduction. Even in those cases, a reduction in the expected 
number of infected herds as a result of the application of vaccina-
tion could not be demonstrated. Preemptive depopulation had 
an effect in reducing the median number of infected herds when 
very large epidemics were modeled (multiple introductions and 
late detection). Considering, however, that this measure would 
double the median number of herds and total animals to be culled, 
cost–benefit analysis will be needed to determine whether the 
benefits of applying this measure would justify the costs both in 
resources and animal welfare. As the current results indicate that 
the effect of preemptive depopulation can only become relevant 
for very large epidemics, this measure should only be considered 
after a large number of infected herds have been detected. Models 
exploring scenarios of FMD spread in the UK and Denmark 
have shown that ring culling can have a positive effect in specific 
circumstances (17, 31). We have, as those authors, concluded that 
the effect is not very pronounced, and more extensive analysis 
will be needed to determine the exact conditions under which 
an outbreak may have become large enough to justify preemptive 
depopulation.
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